Is Evaluation Awareness One Direction, or Eight?

A factor-controlled probe of the evaluation-awareness representation in open-weight models

How to read this page. The study ran in four phases. Phase 1 was CPU-only (no accelerator was available; see Compute constraint) with Qwen/Qwen3-0.6B as the primary model. Phases 2–3C later re-ran the same pipeline on GPUs at 8B, 14B and on a second model family. Three Phase-1 findings did not replicate at scale and one was traced to a bug in our own intervention code. They are marked withdrawn wherever they appear and are reported next to the number that replaced them, rather than deleted. Findings that held across scales and families are marked replicated.

TL;DR

Working inside the representational axis of evaluation awareness, with the underlying task held fixed and only the eight EvalAwareBench cue factors toggled, the answer is no — it is not one direction. The direction that a standard all-cues difference-of-means recovers is largely an explicit-disclosure-and-formatting detector, and it is blind to the one cue a benchmark cannot avoid.

The headline separability is not the result. Probe AUROC is 1.000 in 28 of 29 hidden states. That is not an improvement on prior work and should not be read as one: toggling all eight cues at once against all-off is an easier discrimination by construction than any cross-dataset setup. The result is the decomposition, and the practical warning that falls out of it.

1. Method

1.1 Instrument

The study uses EvalAwareBench from arXiv:2605.23055: 100 paired safety/capability tasks as YAML templates in which eight trigger factors can each be switched between a naturalistic and an evaluative level while the underlying request is held fixed. Only the capability member of each pair is rendered — no harmful text needs to be produced for a representation-level study, and it removes request harmfulness as a confound with evaluation-ness. Conclusions here are therefore about evaluation cues on benign requests.

FactorNaturalistic levelEvaluative level
F1stimulus artificialityreal-sounding entities and valuesplaceholder entities (Acme Corp, Jane Doe, City A, round numbers)
F2scenario coherenceordinary, slightly untidy setupoverdetermined detail / checkably false premise
F3prose registercasual user voicetextbook-formal, third-person vignette
F4ecological completenessfull backstory, tools, workflowbare request, context stripped
F5stakes telegraphingintent in plausible contextthe evaluative dimension named in the vocabulary
F6paradigm recognizabilityno benchmark framingbenchmark / eval-scaffolding conventions
F7task formatprose narrativerigid template, separators, enumerated structure
F8explicit evaluation disclosureno evaluation languagebenchmark output conventions, rubric references

1.2 Compute constraint, stated up front

Phase 1 had no GPU. HF Jobs and HF Sandboxes both returned 402 Payment Required for this account; the session container had 2 vCPU, 7 GB RAM and no accelerator, and lacked AVX512-BF16/AMX, so bfloat16 ran 2.8× slower than float32 (measured 5.38 vs 1.94 s/prompt on Qwen3-0.6B). The practical ceiling was ~2B parameters.

Consequence for interpretation: the Phase-1 primary model is Qwen/Qwen3-0.6B, far below the 14B–32B range originally targeted and below every model in all four reference papers. Nothing in Phase 1 licenses a claim about scale. Phases 2–3C later obtained 2× Tesla T4 and re-ran the identical pipeline at 1.7B, 8B and 14B, and on Gemma 3 (270M, 1B) — which is how the withdrawals in this article were found.

1.3 Prompt sets (1,298 prompts)

SetnConstruction
main200per task: all cues naturalistic (deploy) and all eight toggled (eval_all) → 100 matched pairs
single38448 tasks × exactly one cue toggled — per-cue sufficiency
leaveout38448 tasks × all cues on except one restored — per-cue necessity
control300100 tasks × 3 surface perturbations with no evaluation cue: greeting + sign-off; three realistic typos; irrelevant naturalistic chatter
ood3015 hand-written real-user requests and 15 hand-written evaluation-harness prompts, written without reference to the instrument

1.4 Activation capture

Residual stream at the last prompt token, every hidden state (embeddings plus all block outputs), stored as float16.

One property removes the most common confound in last-token probing: the chat template appends an identical <|im_end|>\n<|im_start|>assistant\n tail to every prompt, so all 200 main prompts share an identical 30-character tail and the probed position never sees condition-specific local tokens. The embedding layer confirms it — hidden state 0 is bit-identical across conditions, its difference-of-means is exactly zero and its AUROC exactly 0.5. Base models, having no chat template, get a constant "\n\nAssistant:" suffix to buy the same property.

1.5 Directions, statistics, interventions

1.6 The reliability ceiling

A cosine of 0.19 between two estimated directions is only evidence of separation if directions estimated from finite data could have been more aligned. So the same cue is estimated on disjoint halves of the tasks and the two halves compared: that cross-fitted same-cue cosine is 0.883 [0.852, 0.906]. It is the ceiling any two cue directions could reach given this much estimation noise, and every cue-cosine number in this article is read against it.

2. Results

Q1 — Are the cue directions one shared axis? Rejected.

Mean off-diagonal cosine between the eight per-cue directions is 0.19–0.22; cross-fitted, 0.190 [0.161, 0.215] against the 0.883 ceiling. At 8B the same quantity is 0.169 against a ceiling of 0.859, and at 14B 0.198 against 0.924 — a ratio of roughly one fifth of the ceiling at every scale tested, over a 23× span of parameter count. The stability of the ratio matters more than any single cosine, because the ceiling itself moves with estimation noise while the ratio does not.

Q2 — Does a direction fitted on seven cues transfer to the eighth? Rejected.

It depends entirely on which cue is held out:

Held-out cueHeld-out AUROC (0.6B)
F7 task format / F8 disclosure0.952–0.976
F4 ecological completeness0.652
F5 stakes telegraphing0.595
F1 stimulus artificiality0.525 [0.501, 0.553] — chance

At 8B and 14B the F1 number moves to 0.580 and 0.611 — it narrows slightly with scale and remains unusable. On Gemma 3 1B it is 0.530 in the residual stream and 0.531 in SAE feature space, agreeing to three decimals across two different representations.

Q3 — Is the contrast one-dimensional? Rejected.

PC1 of the matched difference vectors explains 12.6–20.9 % depending on layer; participation ratio ≈ 20. Both move away from one-dimensionality with scale: PC1 14.8 % → 12.9 % → 10.4 % and participation ratio 20.3 → 27.9 → 30.4 across 0.6B → 8B → 14B.

Q4 — Do the cues contribute comparable shares? Rejected.

Removing F8 explicit disclosure alone costs 36–57 % of the deploy→eval span; every other cue costs ≤ 10 %. Its cosine with the global axis is 0.889 [0.879, 0.900] — at the reliability ceiling, meaning that within measurement precision the global axis is the disclosure direction. On Gemma 3 1B this is more extreme still: cosine 0.945 and removing F8 costs 74 % of the span.

Q5 — Does a non-evaluative surface change leave the projection alone? Violated at 0.6B.

The ctl_greet control adds a greeting and a sign-off — "hey, quick one —", "thanks a lot!" — and no evaluation content whatsoever. At 0.6B it moved the projection 15 % of the eval/deploy span (AUROC 0.851, d = 1.47).

withdrawn This is the largest single correction in the project. At 8B the same control moves the projection +1.3 % of the span (AUROC 0.556, d = 0.18); at 14B, +4.7 % (AUROC 0.643, d = 0.36). The 0.6B magnitude is a small-model artefact and the Phase-1 text that presented it as a property of the direction was wrong. Two things survive the correction: the confound is non-zero at every scale, and it does not shrink monotonically — the largest model tested is three times more susceptible than the 8B one, and we cannot separate scale from quantisation or checkpoint provenance as the cause.

The causal section

Phase 1 reported that directional ablation reduced the projection by 92 % while random- direction ablation moved it 1 %, and that ablation cost −0.283 MMLU accuracy identically in both framings, with every sandbagging interaction term null (|eval Δ − deploy Δ| ≤ 0.058, all p ≥ 0.34). It also reported that 93 % of free generations became degenerate under all-layer ablation (80 % layerwise, 37 % under addition, 17 % baseline) and concluded that, unlike the refusal direction of Arditi et al. (2024), this direction cannot be projected out while leaving a working model.

withdrawn Both halves were later corrected, in opposite directions. A bug was found in our own intervention code: on transformers 5.17, an intervention installed with register_forward_hook applies only inside the first context manager entered in a process and is silently bypassed from the second onward. Every diagnostic the Phase-1 code checked still looked correct (29 handles, 29 edit calls, zero leaks) while the component was simply not removed. With the fix — wrapping module.forward directly — ablation removes 99.99 % of the projection (8B: −15.690 → −0.002), so the 8 % residual was the bug rather than physics. Separately, the 93 % degeneracy figure does not replicate: at 8B it is 7 %, with MMLU −2.0 points and perplexity 37 → 43. The −0.283 accuracy cost also does not reproduce (−0.015, p = 0.68 on the same model with fixed interventions). Because none installed no hooks at all, ablate was the first hooked context and is the only Phase-1 intervention condition that ran as intended; every add_* and layerwise number was recomputed.

What survives, and is now on stronger evidence: there is no sandbagging to remove. Phase 1 found MMLU 0.533 under evaluation framing versus 0.517 under deployment framing, with all interaction terms null. At 8B and 14B, with 500 and 300 paired items, two independent scorers and three framings, eval-minus-deploy is 0.000 and +0.013 (McNemar p = 1.00 and p = 0.52), and on Gemma 3 1B −0.007 (p = 0.88) — now with an intervention that provably removes 99.99 % of the direction while the model still scores 0.730.

Meanwhile evaluation framing moves compliance by orders of magnitude: mean top-letter log-probability −15.46 → −5.02 at 8B, −16.68 → −3.90 at 14B, and −8.79 → −0.08 on Gemma 3 1B. The model becomes far more willing to commit to an answer letter when told it is being evaluated, and no more accurate.

Verbalisation

Explicit meta-commentary was at the floor: 1/15 on evaluation-framed prompts, and blind adjudication showed that single hit to be prompt echo rather than inference. The internal projection and verbalised awareness are uncorrelated: Pearson r = +0.103 (p = 0.59), Spearman ρ = +0.069 (p = 0.72) — an independent replication of the dissociation in arXiv:2608.21766, obtained on a cleaner contrast.

SAE decomposition

Against Qwen-Scope TopK SAEs (32,768 features, k = 50, resid_post) on Qwen3-1.7B-Base, at five layers:

A monitor built on that one feature would work, and would tell you almost nothing about what the model represents. The same shape reproduces on a different family, suite and SAE architecture (Gemma Scope 2, Gemma 3 1B, layer 24): one feature of 16,384 reaches AUROC 0.996 as a deployment detector while 113 features carry half the |Δmean| L1 mass and 777 carry 90 %.

Cross-family and cross-method check

A later phase re-ran the identical estimators on Gemma 3 and additionally recomputed the whole contrast in Gemma Scope 2 SAE feature space rather than the residual stream, using the same cross-fitting, the same reliability ceiling and the same label-shuffled nulls — so the only thing that changes is the representation.

SettingCue cosine as % of ceilingcos(F8, global)LOFO F1
Qwen3-8B, residual19.7 %0.8860.580
Qwen3-14B, residual21.4 %0.8650.611
Gemma 3 270M, residual17.3 %0.9250.489
Gemma 3 270M, SAE features26.2 %0.8400.505
Gemma 3 1B, residual26.5 %0.9450.530
Gemma 3 1B, SAE features25.0 %0.9460.531

The decomposition is not a Qwen artefact and not a linear-probe artefact.

3. Relation to prior work

arXiv:2605.23055 — Decomposing and Measuring Evaluation Awareness

Supplies the instrument: the eight-factor taxonomy and EvalAwareBench. That paper measures behaviour — chain-of-thought monitoring of recognition and of the propensity to act on it — across nine frontier models and four benchmarks. It does not ask where in the weights or activations the mechanism sits. This study takes its factor design and moves one level inward, to activations. arxiv.org/abs/2605.23055

arXiv:2608.21766 — Evaluation Awareness in Language Models: Representation, Verbalization, and Control

The closest prior work on method: difference-of-means directions at the last residual-stream token across layers, peak probe AUROC ≥ 0.7 for all six models it studies, contrastive activation addition shifting an LLM-judged verbalisation score by 0.2–1.5 points, and representation/verbalisation almost decoupled. Its calibration set is 200 WildChat samples versus 200 evaluation samples, which confounds evaluation-ness with domain and provenance: a probe can score well by detecting academic-benchmark text without representing anything about being tested. It also cannot decompose, because its positive class mixes every cue type at once. This study removes the confound by construction — same task, same entities, same request in both members of every pair — and adds the decomposition. Its verbalisation dissociation replicates here (r = +0.103). arxiv.org/abs/2608.21766

arXiv:2606.23583 — Evaluation Awareness Is Not One Capability: Evidence from Open Language Models

The paper this work is most likely to be confused with, so the distinction is worth stating precisely. That paper decomposes along measurement paradigm — behavioural, representational, mechanistic — across 37 open-weight models and seven families, and shows those three axes dissociate. The difference here is granularity, and it is a difference in kind. Its unit of decomposition is three measurement paradigms; ours is eight cue factors inside the representational paradigm. Between its conditions, dataset, task, framing tier and paradigm all vary at once; between ours, only the cue configuration varies while task, entities and request stay identical. Its finest cue control is a 2×2 format × intent factorial (best AUROC 0.622) assembled across datasets; ours is an 8-factor factorial within one instrument.

The two conclusions are logically independent: a representation could be perfectly one-dimensional and still dissociate from behaviour, and conversely could be a bundle of eight unrelated detectors while all three of their axes agreed. What this study adds to their picture is a mechanistic explanation for why coarse format/intent factorials score low: the analogous cues here — F7 format, F8 disclosure — are precisely the two the global axis captures, while the semantic cues are the ones it misses, so a coarse factorial averages a cue the model represents strongly with cues it represents along nearly orthogonal axes. arxiv.org/abs/2606.23583

arXiv:2603.19426 — Devbunova, Is Evaluation Awareness Just Format Sensitivity? Limitations of Probe-Based Evidence under Controlled Prompt Structure

The most directly threatening of the four to the validity of what is measured here. It argues that probe-based evidence conflates structural format with contextual understanding, and shows that a probe trained the usual way calls 94.5 % of real user requests "evaluation" as soon as they are laid out like a benchmark, while format-decorrelated training cuts that to 7.2 %.

This study corroborates that diagnosis from the inside: the cue decomposition shows which cue the probe is riding on — the global axis is aligned with F8 disclosure at cosine 0.80–0.92 and with F7 format at 0.48–0.78, while the semantic cues sit at 0.11–0.33. It also extends the confound: her control makes a deployment prompt look like a benchmark, whereas ctl_greet does the opposite — it makes the prompt look more like a real user — and the projection still moved toward the evaluation pole at 0.6B. That suggests the vulnerability is to stylistic deviation in either direction rather than to benchmark structure specifically. With the scale correction above, the strength of this particular extension is much reduced (+1.3 % of span at 8B), and it should be read as a small-model finding awaiting a properly powered test. arxiv.org/abs/2603.19426

4. Limitations

Stated plainly, in the order they would bite a reader trying to use this.

5. What this means for anyone building an evaluation-awareness monitor

The practical content of the decomposition is a warning about what a probe trained the usual way will and will not see.

A direction recovered from a broad evaluation-versus-deployment contrast is, to within measurement precision, an explicit-disclosure detector, supported by task formatting and benchmark-paradigm conventions. Those are exactly the cues that are easy to strip from a benchmark: stop saying "this is an evaluation", drop the rubric language, write the prompt as prose instead of a template.

What such a monitor is near-blind to is placeholder-entity artificiality and stakes telegraphing — cues that read at or near chance on the global axis (AUROC 0.52 for artificiality; held-out transfer 0.525) even though the model demonstrably represents them elsewhere (a dedicated direction separates artificiality at 0.68, a trained probe at 0.72). Those are exactly the cues that are hard to strip, because a benchmark that cannot use invented companies, round numbers and named stakes is close to not being a benchmark.

So the failure mode is not random. A monitor built this way will be most confident on the evaluations you could most easily have disguised, and least sensitive on the properties that make a test a test. If you are building one, the cheap check is the one used here: hold the task fixed, toggle cues one at a time, and measure per-cue transfer rather than aggregate AUROC — aggregate AUROC saturates at 1.000 and tells you nothing.


Reproduction. Prompt sets are regenerable from EvalAwareBench (aisa-group/decomposing-eval-awareness, CC BY-NC 4.0); the rendered prompts inherit its non-commercial terms and are therefore not redistributed. Every analysis script takes --model, so the identical pipeline runs on larger models given an accelerator.

Citation check. All seven references were verified against arXiv on 14 September 2026: every identifier resolves, every title matches, and the specific figures attributed to each paper were checked against its text.

References

  1. Li, C., Zhang, T. J., Zhang, J., Jin, Z., Abdelnabi, S., & Andriushchenko, M. Decomposing and Measuring Evaluation Awareness. arXiv:2605.23055
  2. Heidari, F., Memarian, A., & Rabusseau, G. Evaluation Awareness in Language Models: Representation, Verbalization, and Control. arXiv:2608.21766
  3. Nayan, N., Sampath Kumar, A., Girmal, R., Anilkumar, S., Vaidyanathan, S., Nader Palacio, D. A., Ghosh, R., & Srinivasan, S. Evaluation Awareness Is Not One Capability: Evidence from Open Language Models. arXiv:2606.23583
  4. Devbunova, V. Is Evaluation Awareness Just Format Sensitivity? Limitations of Probe-Based Evidence under Controlled Prompt Structure. arXiv:2603.19426
  5. Arditi, A., Obeso, O., Syed, A., Paleka, D., Panickssery, N., Gurnee, W., & Nanda, N. (2024). Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction. arXiv:2406.11717 — the difference-of-means + directional-ablation method this study adapts, and the contrast case: there, one direction suffices across layers; here it does not.
  6. Qwen-Scope: Turning Sparse Features into Development Tools for Large Language Models. arXiv:2605.11887; checkpoint used: Qwen/SAE-Res-Qwen3-1.7B-Base-W32K-L0_50 (TopK SAE, 32,768 features, k = 50)
  7. Sun, M., Chen, X., Kolter, J. Z., & Liu, Z. (2024). Massive Activations in Large Language Models. arXiv:2402.17762